Ukraine faces harsh winter as Russian strikes hit economy, budget and exports

Ukraine’s winter of 2026 could become one of the toughest tests since the full-scale invasion began. Russian strikes have already caused about $10 billion in infrastructure damage, disruption at Black Sea ports threatens tens of billions of dollars in exports, and the daily cost of the war has risen to $190 million.

Ukraine is entering the cold season under a dangerous combination of military, energy and financial pressure. Intensified Russian strikes are damaging critical infrastructure and industry just as the state must simultaneously fund the army, repair the power system and prepare cities for winter.

Economy Minister Oleksandr Kravchenko estimates damage to infrastructure and fixed assets from Russian air strikes this year at close to $10 billion. The broader effect of the attacks and the effective disruption of port operations, he says, is costing the economy roughly 1.5 percentage points of GDP.

The damage is no longer limited to the replacement cost of a destroyed power station, warehouse or factory. Every strike creates a second economic shock: production stops, businesses lose orders, workers lose income, the state loses tax revenue, and transport and energy costs rise for companies that remain operational.

Daycom’s preliminary analysis of open and verified data indicates that the main winter risk lies in the accumulation of these effects. Russian strikes are simultaneously shrinking the economic base that finances defense and forcing the government to spend more on repairs, protection, backup power and social support.

Black Sea exports have become one of the most vulnerable links. Intensified attacks on southern regions and port infrastructure have severely constrained the normal operation of maritime routes. Kravchenko estimates that around $40 billion in export revenue is now exposed to risk because of the disruption.

Ukraine traditionally ships large volumes of grain, vegetable oil, iron ore, steel and other bulk commodities through its Black Sea ports. Maritime logistics are critical for these goods because volumes are high and margins relatively thin. Shifting cargo to rail or road makes exports more expensive and less competitive.

Attacks on logistics therefore operate as a distinct form of economic pressure. Russia does not need to physically destroy an entire port to cause major losses: raising risks for vessels, insurers, terminals and rail approaches can be enough to make some shipments uneconomic or repeatedly halt them.

Public finances are deteriorating at the same time. Official parliamentary budget data show that, over the first eight months of the year, general-fund revenue excluding grants came in 33.1 billion hryvnias below target. Nearly half of that shortfall — 15.6 billion hryvnias — was recorded in August alone.

A broader estimate of domestic revenue presented at a conference in Kyiv put the shortfall at about $1.35 billion. The difference reflects different categories and accounting methods, but the direction is the same: the war is placing growing pressure on the state’s ability to generate enough money internally.

During the first eight months of the year, Ukraine spent around $42 billion on defense, excluding military assistance provided in kind. Domestic revenue and local borrowing generated about $39 billion. Even Ukraine’s own share of military needs is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to cover without external resources.

The daily cost of the war in 2026 has risen to roughly $190 million, according to parliamentary budget committee chair Roksolana Pidlasa, compared with about $140 million in 2024. She cited inflation, a larger force, more expensive ammunition and higher social payments to the families of fallen service members.

That creates a fundamentally more difficult fiscal structure. In earlier years, international support largely financed civilian needs while domestic resources were directed toward defense. The scale of military spending now increasingly requires Kyiv to seek external funding for maintaining defense capacity itself.

Despite the shortage of resources, preparations for the heating season continue. By early September, 79.2% of the housing stock scheduled for winter preparation was ready — more than 114,000 buildings out of nearly 144,000. Particular attention is being paid to front-line regions where utility infrastructure remains under constant threat.

The government and local authorities are repairing heating networks, boiler houses and water systems, building fuel reserves and deploying distributed generation. But preparation this year means more than routine maintenance: communities need backup power and the ability to restore basic services rapidly after fresh strikes.

In early September, the government acknowledged that some regions were behind schedule in building protective structures and connecting essential equipment. The prime minister ordered tighter oversight of every critical facility because completing the work before cold weather is now a matter of state resilience rather than comfort.

The problem is that Russia may be able to destroy infrastructure faster than Ukraine can restore it. A protected transformer, new boiler house or gas-engine unit improves resilience, but each requires equipment, personnel and money — the same resources that are increasingly demanded by the front.

A particularly dangerous scenario would combine attacks on energy infrastructure with strikes on export industries. If a factory loses electricity while a port loses the ability to ship its output, the economic effects multiply. Production falls first, followed by foreign-currency earnings, employment and tax receipts.

That is why Ukraine’s winter resilience will depend on more than the number of air-defense missiles or the size of gas reserves. The functioning of ports, railways, steelmaking, agricultural exports and the banking system will be equally important. The state must preserve both physical operations and the cash flow that finances them.

International assistance remains a critical part of that structure. In the first eight months alone, 569.6 billion hryvnias in grant support entered the general budget fund, while total cash expenditures of the state budget reached 4.04 trillion hryvnias. The figures illustrate the scale of the wartime economy’s dependence on partners.

Ukraine’s winter of 2026 will therefore test not one energy sector but the entire model of the wartime economy. Russia is trying to make every strike produce two effects — first destroying a physical asset, then turning that loss into lower exports, weaker revenue and a larger budget deficit.

Ukraine has learned how to rebuild its power system after large-scale attacks, create alternative routes and keep the state functioning during war. But the fifth wartime heating season begins with a thinner financial cushion. This winter, the decisive resource will be not only energy, but the economy’s ability to pay for its own resilience.